

Cripps Mission and Political Deadlock in India

Dr. Farooq Ahmad Dar

Professor
Department of History
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad.

The beginning of the Second World War had a great impact on global history. If on one hand, it resulted in destruction, on the other it completely changed the dynamics of international politics. Though eventually, the Allied Powers managed to override the Axis Powers, for most time during the war Germany-Japan Alliance dominated the proceedings. This hurt the political and economic life in the Allied nations. Britain was no exception. A state, which was dominating world affairs, and had colonized a big chunk of territories in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, now had to focus on its internal stability. The country looked devastated and shattered, as there emerged a major shortage of both human and financial resources to overcome the problems it was facing. However, the politicians of the country, to combat the situation, decided to make a coalition government with Winston Churchill as the Prime Minister. In this new set-up, five major parties including Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal National Party, Liberal Party, and National Labour Party joined hands to bring the country out of the chaos. With this, the government alliance had approximately ninety-eight percent representation in the British parliament, and thus had the mandate to take bold decisions. Alongside the task to put the internal house in order, one of the major questions the War Cabinet had to address was to decide if Britain could afford to maintain a global empire anymore. The odds were against them and their retreat from the areas they had occupied was but obvious.

Among the British colonies, India was perhaps the most significant. Even before the start of the war, political consciousness had reached its maturity in India and a strong anti-imperial struggle had started. Indian National Congress, the party which had emerged as the champion of Indian Nationalism,

had managed to form government in the majority of the provinces after the elections of 1936-37. At the beginning of the War, Congress first put pressure on the British by quitting the ministries and then used Satyagraha as a tool to launch a resistance campaign against the British at the grassroots level. The party was not ready to even negotiate with their colonial masters unless they were given the guarantee to get complete freedom.¹ Like Congress, All-India Muslim League, which by then had emerged as the largest Muslim representative body in India, declared following the “fundamental principles, laid down by the Lahore Resolution for division of India and creating the Muslim States in the North-West and Eastern Zones”, and the “approval and consent of Muslim India” before finalizing “any scheme of constitution”, as a prerequisite to any discussion with the British.² When the British tried to play smart and inducted some members of the League into the National Defence Council, without the consent of the central leadership of the party, the League Working Committee not only asked its members to restrain from joining the Council but also took strong disciplinary action against those who decided to side with the British.³ Jinnah directly told Churchill that Muslims would not “submit” to any proposal short of the approval of the “Pakistan scheme”, which to him, was the only solution to “India’s constitutional problem.”⁴

In light of the prevailing circumstances, the British tried their best to keep the stakeholders of Indian politics in the loop, and with the aim to resolve the political deadlock, attempted to persuade Congress and the League to support them during the war. Initially, the task was assigned to the Viceroy, the 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow, to communicate with the leadership of the two parties.⁵ Later, attempts were made directly by the British Government, and the formulas like August Offer were presented. However, it was at the beginning of 1942 that the intensity of the British efforts to take the Indians on board accelerated.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, brought the United States directly into the war. Franklin D. Roosevelt realized the importance of India to counter Japan and

thus during Churchill's visit from December 22, 1941, till January 14, 1942, persuaded him to respond to Indian aspirations by giving them their democratic right of self-determination.⁶ China also started putting pressure on the British Government to procure India's support for the war effort by negotiating a resolution of her constitutional problem. Furthermore, a series of Japanese victories in the region including the capture of Singapore on February 15, 1942, and the fall of Rangoon on March 8, 1942, pushed a panic button in London. The Japanese had reached the borders of Assam and eastern Bengal, and the threat of them attacking the British Indian territories was very much on the cards.⁷

In Churchill's War Cabinet there were voices in favor of the idea that Indian goodwill should be won by generous political concessions. Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour Party and the Deputy Prime Minister in the War Cabinet, was convinced that it was vital for the British to launch a diplomatic initiative to win over the backing of Indian politicians, especially Congress leadership. As early as February 2, he recommended to "entrust some person of high standing... with wide powers to negotiate a settlement in India".⁸ His efforts proved fruitful as Churchill realized that without the support of the likes of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, they couldn't mobilize the Indian masses against the Japanese attacks.⁹ On February 9, the British Prime Minister presented a scheme envisaged a Defence of India Council before the War Cabinet. To execute the plan, Stafford Cripps was inducted into the War Cabinet on February 19, as Production Minister. He was also the Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of Commons. On February 28, a six-member War Cabinet Committee on India was constituted with the task to draft a policy regarding India.¹⁰ The Committee discussed their proposal with the men who matter and in the light of the suggestions they received from different quarters, they finalized their recommendations.¹¹ The War Cabinet on March 9 decided that the input of the Indian political elements was essential before the finalization of the draft declaration. Churchill in his speech before the House of Commons on March 11, declared that "the crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance" had made his

Government “wish to rally on all the forces of Indian life”. He deputed Cripps to tour India and negotiate with the indigenous leaders to find out a “just and final solution” for the “present and future action in India”. He wished that the Indians would look beyond their internal disputes which could be “destructive” for their “internal harmony” and “fatal to the setting up of a new Constitution”.¹²

The selection of Cripps for this all-important job raised many eyebrows. It was considered a move regarding the British policy of appeasement towards Congress.¹³ Cripps was not only known for his pro-Congress stance but he also openly expressed his anti-League sentiments in the past.¹⁴ His friendship with Nehru¹⁵ and his admiration of Gandhi were an open secret. In his earlier visit to India, he traveled to Gandhi’s remote central Indian village ashram, just to see him. To show his respect he once even tried to dress up like Gandhi.¹⁶ Some of his critics even labeled him as the “English Gandhi”.¹⁷ Cripps also spent “several days at Wardha during the meeting of the Congress Working Committee” and had a series of conversations with Azad, the then party’s president.¹⁸ He told Azad that if Congress would not accept the Cripps Proposals, it would become difficult for people like him who had acted as Congress’s “best friends in British political circles” to “assist them towards the aim which they had” in the times to come.¹⁹ Congress welcomed the decision of the British government to appoint Cripps. On the contrary, Mohammad Ali Jinnah termed him “a friend of the Congress” and made the people remember that he in the past had “enjoyed the hospitality of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru at Anand Bhawan.”²⁰ Even the British Secretary of State, Leo Amery, expressed that the selection of an “extreme Left Winger” who was “in close touch with Nehru and the Congress” would be alarming for the “Muslims” and they would think that the British were “selling out to Congress.”²¹ Linlithgow, because of the same reason, was not happy with the selection of Cripps. He openly suggested to Cripps that he, immediately after he arrives in India, should dispel the “fears among Muslims arising from their conception” of his “last visit to India”.²²

A confident Cripps landed on Indian soil on March 22, 1942, with the hope to complete his mission in two weeks. The proposals he brought revolves around the central idea of laying down “in precise and clear terms” the steps which could provide the option for “the earliest possible relaisation of self-government in India” and the “creation of a new Indian Union”, a “Dominion”, which was “in no way subordinate” to United Kingdom and other Dominions”, in any “aspect of its domestic or external affairs.” The plan focuses on the following five points: a) An “elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution” would be set up “immediately upon the cessation of hospitalities”; b) Provision would be made “for the participation of the Indian States in the constitution-making body”; c) Any “Province of the British India” that was not willing “to accept the new Constituion” would be allowed to make “subsequent accession if it so decides.” The “non-acceding Provinces” would be allowed to have their own “Constitution” and “the same full status as Indian Union”; d) The “entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislature” would constitute “a single electoral college” for the composition of the “constitution-making body by the system of propotional representation.” The Princely States would also “appoint representative in the same proportion to their total population”; e) Till the end of the “critical period” and the framing of the “Constitution” the British would “bear the responsibility” for the “defecne of India as part of their world war effort” in which they would use the “military, moral and material resources of India.”²³

During his overnight stay in Karachi, Cripps met Hugh Dow, the Governor of Sindh, and Allah Baksh, the province’s Chief Minister.²⁴ The next morning he moved to Delhi. On his arrival, Cripps claimed that being a “friend and admirer of India” he wanted to play a role “in reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties” by knowing if the formula drafted by the “War Cabinet” was “generally acceptable to Indian opinion” or not? He added that because of the shortage of time it would only be possible for him to meet selective Indian representatives, who were the nominees of Congress, League, Hindu Mahasabha, Liberal Party, Chamber of Princes, Sikhs, and the Scheduled

Castes.²⁵ However, he spent the first couple of days meeting the British officials including the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, the Executive Council, and the Governors of different provinces. Linlithgow showed his commitment to give Cripps “every possible assistance” and do his “utmost in every way to make a success of his mission.” However, he cautioned Cripps that he should “get the scheme over in such a way” that even if it was not accepted “its presentation may not cause serious mischief” to the British war effort, and should not damage “to what remains of goodwill and support on the part of Indians” towards the British.²⁶ Archibald Wavell told Cripps that the “Pakistan idea” would raise real problems for him as the other issues “were unlikely to have any serious adverse effect.” At their request, Cripps shared the draft of the scheme with the members of the Executive Council, but only with the “understanding” that they would regard it as “being of the utmost secrecy.”²⁷ In the meeting of the Executive Council, Feroz Khan Noon, Hormasji Pherozeshah Mody, Arcot Ramasamy Mudaliar, Reginald Maxwell, Raghavendra Rao, Sultan Ahmad, and Nalini Ranjan Sarkar participated in the discussion on the draft.²⁸

On March 25, Cripps held separate meetings with Congress and the League presidents and shared his proposal with them. His encounter with Abul Kalam Azad, in his own assessment, was “extremely friendly”. However, on Azad’s suggestion that to “mobilise effectively the forces of India people” it was “necessary” to “give the Indian control of the defence of their country”, Cripps categorically informed him that “strategically India had to be regarded as a part of a much greater theatre of war” and thus the “British Government” had to “retain all control of Indian defence in its own hands.”²⁹ Cripps knew the importance of Gandhi and Nehru and thus told Azad that he would soon meet both of them. Cripps’s meeting with Jinnah also went well. He apologized for “his article in the *Tribune*”³⁰ and told Jinnah that he had changed his “old views” and was fully ready to “appreciate the Muslim case.”³¹ Likewise, Jinnah had also earlier asked his people that they “should not be afraid” of Cripps earlier behavior because he “had come to India not in his personal capacity but as representative of the British

Government.”³² Jinnah was concerned mainly with the “first part of the document” that deals with the “Pakistan case.” He raised the question that if “Bengal and Punjab... would have the effective right to opt out of the constitution in the event of their so desiring”? He suggested that to know the real opinion of the people of these provinces “plebiscite was the only absolutely fair idea.”³³ Jinnah “pointed out that the closing words of paragraph (c) (i) were too indefinite.”³⁴ Cripps agreed for the “alteration to meet the point” which Jinnah had raised.³⁵ Overall, Jinnah told Cripps that he could only give him his final assessment of the draft after consultation with the Working Committee of his party.

On March 26, Cripps held a series of meetings with men of significance³⁶. On the next day, he first met the Sikh leaders including Baldev Sing, Ujjal Singh, Tara Singh, and Jogendra Singh, who demanded the creation of a Sikh nation-state in the areas of Punjab where they were in majority.³⁷ They asked for the “protection of Sikh minority and the possibility of having some redistribution of provincial power between the eastern and west Punjab in order to carve out a province in which the Sikhs would have the decisive voice as a large balancing party between Hindu and Moslem.” They also supported the Congress’s demand that “an Indian Minister should be associated with Defence.” Cripps told them that the War Cabinet had already emphasized on the “matter of the protection of the Sikhs” because of “the contributions that the Sikhs had made” to “the defence of India.”³⁸ Cripps’s next meeting of the day was with Gandhi, which proved to be the most challenging one. Gandhi was a big opponent of the idea of India joining the war, not only because it would violate the principle of nonviolence, but also because he believed that the chances of the Allies winning the war were very remote.³⁹ Though Gandhi stated that he was meeting Cripps in his personal capacity and not as a leader of Congress, he claimed that Congress would reject the plan on two grounds, i.e. the issue of “the Indian States” and the “accession or non-accession of Provinces.” He elaborated that Congress would neither “tolerate the continuance of those autocratic States under the aegis of the British Government” nor would it accept the idea of giving “an invitation to the Moslems to create Pakistan.” Gandhi also questioned the Government’s agenda

regarding “the retention of Defence in British hands.” Gandhi categorically stated that “he thought it would have been better” had Cripps “not come to India with a cut and dried scheme to impose upon the Indians”⁴⁰ and advised him “to take the next flight home.”⁴¹ In the evening Cripps met a delegation of Europeans who were mainly interested in the protection of their interests “both during the transition period and in the permanent setup after self-government” was granted.⁴²

Jinnah and Azad once again met Cripps on March 28. Both of them raised some questions in the meeting but most of them were the repetition of what they had asked earlier. In Cripps’s opinion, it seemed as if Jinnah and his party “had already accepted the scheme in principle” and were only interested in knowing the details about the “questions of formation of a Government under clause (e)”⁴³, while Azad was “depressed at the apparent cheerfulness of the Muslim League”.⁴⁴ A delegation of the Chamber of Princes, in its meeting with Cripps, was interested in knowing if they could retain the military and diplomatic support of Britain’s paramount power or not. They showed their concern about the status of Princely States “vis-à-vis the new Indian Union and His Majesty’s Government.”⁴⁵ Some of them wanted either complete independence from India or the continuation of British protection.⁴⁶ In a separate meeting, Rajagopalachari wanted the British to use the term “Free Member State” and not “Dominion” in the document.⁴⁷ The delegation of Hindu Mahasabha led by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar emphasized “the principles of majority determination”, and wanted “an immediate declaration in the terms of the first paragraph”, but strongly “opposed to the right of non-accession.”⁴⁸ On the next morning, Nehru⁴⁹ joined Cripps on breakfast and then the two of them went to Birla House, where they met Gandhi, Azad, Govind Ballabh Pant, and Balasaheb Gangadhar Kher. The discussion mainly revolved around the same old issues. Congress leaders mainly raised questions regarding Cripps giving importance to the League and the issue of transferring the “paramountcy” of all the Princely States to the Indian Union.⁵⁰ Gandhi was of the view that Cripps was “a good man” but he was equipped with “bad machinery – British Imperialism” and he was sure that “in the end, it will be the

machinery that will get the better of him.”⁵¹ Cripps realized that “Gandhi was against him” but still he was hopeful that “the difficulty of rejecting the offer might lead to its acceptance.”⁵²

Finally, on March 29, Cripps publicly announced the contents of his proposals at a press conference where he tried to satisfy the natives of India, especially Congress leadership. He claimed that the British came up with their plan only because the natives in the past have failed to “put forward a joint scheme” of “self-government” for Indians. He categorically stated that the British government would not “impose anything on India, not even a time limit”, and “immediately after the termination of hostilities” and “not at the end of the war”, a “constitution-making body would be set up” based on “Provincial elections.” He said, that his government “wished to create a new India with a wholly Indian constitution framed by Indian” and added that the British would leave India when “the constitution-making body” would “decide upon the constitution.” He acknowledged that he was not only ready to amend the formula in consultation with the Indian leaders but had already “made some changes in the draft.” Regarding the future of the Princely States who were not interested in joining the Union, he stated that they would “remain in exactly the same situation” as they were, and elaborated that their “treaties... with Britain” would “continue to exist unless somebody wants to alter them.” When asked if two “non-acceding Provinces” located at the two opposite ends of the country might form “a separate union” he replied that it “would be impracticable.” However, he went against the demands of the Congress leadership when disagreed with the idea that the “defence should be in Indian hands” and considered such a move to “disorganize the complete defensive arrangements of India” and termed it as “fatal” for the Indian interests.⁵³

On the morning of March 30, Cripps held meetings with several Indian leaders.⁵⁴ In the evening, he, in a radio speech, broadcasted in India, Britain, and the United States, tried to explain his proposals, which were already published in the morning newspapers. By and large, he repeated the same points which were discussed in the last day’s press conference. He, however, cautioned that his “proposals” were “definite and

precise” and if they were not accepted “there would be neither the time nor the opportunity to reconsider this matter till after the war.” He invited the “immediate and effective participation” of the Indian leaders in the “councils of their countries.” He hoped to “see an Indian Union strong and united” but said that the final decision would be made by the “Indian people” and not the “Britishers.” He requested to “let the dead past bury its dead” and to “march together side by side through the night of high endeavor and courage to the already waking dawn of a new world of liberty for all the peoples”.⁵⁵ Nehru, who was invited for the dinner on the same day, told Cripps that he was “worried about the Indian situation” and fully “conscious of the acute dangers” if the British would not rely on India and its leadership for “her own defence.” In his opinion, the Indian masses had turned against the British because of several reasons including the discriminatory treatment against the “Indian refugees coming from the eastern seaboard to the central districts”, “increasing unemployment”, “shortage of wheat associated with rumours” that it was exported to France, and “growing disbelief in the capacity of Great Britain to make any defence effective in the light of the happenings in Malaya and Singapore.” Cripps’s impression of the meeting was that “Nehru was doing his utmost to gain support for acceptance” of his offer, but due to “the influence of Gandhi”, the Working Committee of Congress “would not accept the proposals.”⁵⁶ Gandhi, by that time, had become “dead against” the Cripps’ formula which he considered as a “blank cheque on a crashing bank”.⁵⁷

Apparently, Cripps continued his activities and held meetings with different delegations including the Akali Movement, Europeans settled in India, the Chamber of Princes, and the All-India Student’s Federation during the next couple of days. He also held individual consultations with several men who matter including Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Allah Baksh, Dasaundha Singh, Naunihal Singh, Vangal Krishnamachari, Ramaswamy Aiyar, Gopalswamy Aiyar, Muhammad Saadulla, Manabendra Nath Roy, Jamnasad Mehta, Maharaja of Parlakimedi, Shiva Rao, Jogesh Chandra Gupta, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mahomad Uzafar, Maharaja of Vizianagram, Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy, and Chimanlal Setalvad. He also sounded confident while defending

his proposals in the press conference on March 31. He reiterated that he had come up with a “precise and clear offer” per the demands of the Indians and that it would be in the hands of the autonomous “Government of India” to decide “how the activities of the Indian population” would be “ordered” in future.⁵⁸ However, by then he had realized that the chances of his success were remote. He was informed that it was not only Congress that was opposing his plan but even “Jinnah had not accepted the scheme and probably would not if the Congress did not.”⁵⁹ Sikh leadership also considered the proposals “unacceptable” because it “lamentably betrayed” them by compromising on the “maintaining and strengthening the integrity of India.”⁶⁰ Even the British who settled in India were not happy and were worried about “the protection of their community and the position in which they would be” if the things materialized.⁶¹ The Viceroy, himself, was not feeling “entirely confident” and believed that “the signs” were “not... favourable.”⁶² All this compelled Cripps to comprehend that “the general response in India was so poor that he would not be justified in recommending H.M.G.’s plan”. He had almost decided that “he was going back” and knew that regarding India it was “the end” for him and he was “finished for the future.”⁶³

A new ray of hope arrived for Cripps when Azad on April 1, showed his and Nehru’s willingness to meet the Commander-in-Chief.⁶⁴ Cripps immediately decided to postpone his departure, which was otherwise scheduled on April 5, for another week. He requested Churchill to give him “full authority subject to agreement of Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy” to negotiate with the Congress regarding the native’s involvement in the “office connected with the Government of India’s defence responsibilities” and to make “some adjustment” in the plan.⁶⁵ Churchill appreciated Cripps’s efforts but informed him that he could not give him “any authority to compromise on defence without submitting issue both to Cabinet and Ministers above the line.”⁶⁶ Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, supported Cripps’s suggestion,⁶⁷ yet the War Cabinet decided that “there was no question... of accepting a nominee of Congress to some office connected with the defence responsibilities.” They, however, suggested that “some suitable Indian, selected by the

Viceroy”, could “be appointed in such a capacity.”⁶⁸ The cabinet was willing to “consider such compromise solution” which was accepted unanimously by Cripps, Wavell, and Linlithgow, but was not ready to give them a “blank cheque in advance.”⁶⁹ Churchill allowed Cripps and Wavell to meet Azad and Nehru, discuss the “Defence question” with them, and ask them “to state their proposals.”⁷⁰ The general impression in London was that “Gandhi had once again persuaded” the Congress that “wrecking” was “the best policy” and thus they would object to every offer. Even if the British “offered them the moon they would probably reject it because of the wrinkles on its surface.”⁷¹

In their meeting with Cripps on April 2, Azad and Nehru informed that according to the “considered opinion of the Congress Working Committee”, their party had “decisively turned the draft document down” because i) it “did not speak clearly of independence”, ii) it gave importance to the opinion of the “rulers” and not the “people of the States” while deciding about their future, iii) the “non-accession point” would encourage the “partition of India” and “made it difficult for any agreement between them and the Muslim League.” Yet, they kept a small window open by saying, “if any change were made they would naturally reconsider their attitude to the document.”⁷² Cripps was quite sure that Gandhi’s group, who were “indifferent as to what happens in the war”, were “a minority”, and if the British manage to satisfy Nehru and company on the issue of “defence”, the “non-violent group will probably retire from all participation in the Working Committee during the war and will leave the other leaders to carry on.” He emphasized that the time had come to decide how far the British were “prepared to go on the chance of getting a settlement.” He warned that a “hostile atmosphere” would nurture in India if Congress would reject the proposals.⁷³ However, against his wishes, Wavell in his meeting with Azad and Nehru on April 4, explained to them the “obstacles to transfer and extent to which an Indian Member who would not hold Defence portfolio could have control in matters strictly within purview of Defence Department”. He categorically stated that it was impossible to separate “Indian and British armies” at that “juncture.”⁷⁴ Here it is important to note that both Linlithgow and Wavell were against the idea “of

giving to an Indian non-official Member of Executive Council some measure of control over Defence.”⁷⁵

Though Cripps was confident that the League was “satisfied and prepared to accept the scheme as it stands”,⁷⁶ Jinnah in his presidential address at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Session of the party expressed disappointment regarding the Cripps proposals as in it “the entity and integrity of the Muslim nation” were not “expressly recognized.” He termed it as an attempt to create a “new Indian Union” and in it, the “Pakistan scheme”, which was “a matter of life and death for Muslim India” was just treated “as a remote possibility.” He criticized the electoral system. According to his estimate, the Muslims would be less than 25 percent in the “constitution-making body” when the “system of proportional representation” was applied. In this case, he feared, that “Gandhi” would manage “a dead certainty of getting a constitution which will emerge for an all-India union.” He wished not “to see that the history of Palestine be repeated.” Jinnah was not prepared to “play the game with loaded dice” as he categorically declared “Pakistan” as the ultimate aim of his party and stated that they would “never accept” any “proposals” through which they could not “achieve Pakistan.” He made it clear that the document was a “bare skeleton of the proposals” and thus “required a lot of filling in adjusting” before it could be made “acceptable.”⁷⁷ Despite Jinnah’s reaction, Cripps did very little to address his concerns. During the last week of his efforts, Cripps never met Jinnah and had only exchanged a couple of letters with him. Rulers of Princely States, Hindu Mahasabha⁷⁸, and other political organizations also had their reservations regarding the proposals, yet Cripps’s only priority was to satisfy the Congress leadership. Even Linlithgow and Wavell were “concerned at the dangers arising from prolonged negotiations with Congress”, when, because of it, “all minorities and Princes” were “seriously upset.”⁷⁹

The United States directly got involved in the situation and Roosevelt sent Louis Johnson to Delhi as his envoy. During the last few days of Cripps in India, he remained one of the main focus of political activities.⁸⁰ He not only provided “efficiently and wholehearted” help to Cripps⁸¹ but was “very favourably

impressed” by the “British War efforts” and was “delighted” by the way the stage was set for “him and the rest of the American Technical team.”⁸² However, alongside helping Cripps in finding a compromising formula, Johnson also showed a tilt towards Congress. He never met the League leadership. On the contrary, Nehru used to visit him “uninvited” and he used to share secret documents with him even without the consent of both Cripps and Linlithgow.⁸³ Johnson was inspired by Nehru’s “charm of manner, grasp of history and logic and wide intellectual gifts”, and was confident that Nehru “would work to assist the war effort even if the Cripps proposals did not go through.” Yet, he declared that the United States was determined to “support Great Britain to the end of the war” and to “preserve the integrity of the British Empire.” He told Nehru that the United States’s “sympathy” for the “Congress would continue” only if they were “convinced that Congress was solidly supporting the war effort.”⁸⁴

To satisfy Congress, Cripps, in consultation with Johnson, was ready to bifurcate the powers of the office of Defence and to hand over some powers to “an Indian Minister” but “without weakening the Commander-in-Chief’s unfettered control over war policy and operations.”⁸⁵ He proposed to Congress that the “Commander-in-Chief should retain his seat on the Viceroy’s Executive Council as War Member” while “an Indian representative member” be added to the “Viceroy’s Executive”, with the powers to take over: i) “those sections of the Department of Defence which can organisationally be separated immediately from the Commander-in-Chief’s War Department”, ii) “the Defence Co-ordination Department” which at that time was “directly working under the Viceroy.”⁸⁶ He was quite confident that his “scheme” would “succeed.”⁸⁷ However, Nehru, by then, realized that he was in a position to bargain as the “British Imperialism” was “considerably weakened” and it had become difficult for them to “survive the war.” He was also aware of the fact that the “solution of India’s problem would affect whole world.” So he openly told the world powers that the “old slogans would not do” and that if they “wanted freedom for the world but that would be meaningless unless it meant freedom for India also.”⁸⁸ He recognized that though “Congress would not break

on the non-accession issue” they would certainly “break if they were not satisfied “on “the issue regarding control of Defence.” He knew that he would “lose his followers if he compromised with the British on the Defence issue.”⁸⁹ Furthermore, Linlithgow and Wavell were not on the same page with Cripps. The former believed that it was “not possible to take away from Commander-in-Chief the substance of the Defence Portfolio” and to “entrust it to a representative Indian.”⁹⁰, while the latter was “convinced” that it was not possible “to separate” his “dual functions” as Commander-in-Chief and defense member “without causing complete dislocation of machine.”⁹¹

When the Johnson-Cripps formula was not endorsed by Congress, they were ready to accommodate Congress’s demands and send them the revised proposals in which the “Defence Department” was to be handed over to the “Indian member”, while the “Commander-in-Chief” should have “control of the armed forces in India”, and act as the “Member of the Executive Council in charge of the War Department.”⁹² In reply to Congress leadership’s question about the “intention of the Governor-General in the matter if a National Government was formed”, Cripps committed that the “Governor-General would proceed to meet the point by means of convention.”⁹³ This new recipe was acceptable to Nehru, as well as the majority of members of the Congress Working Committee. Cripps’s commitment that if Congress would accept his offer, he would become a “tremendous figure in England” and thus would be in a position to “do anything”, further encouraged them.⁹⁴ By April 9, there was a general expectation of an agreement in the Congress circles as Gandhi decided to leave Dehli. Nehru hinted about the acceptance of the plan when he told the reputed cartoonist, Kesava Shankar Pillai, that during the next few days he would be “drawing war cartoons and balking up a national government” as they were “near agreement.”⁹⁵

All these developments were taking place without the consent of Linlithgow and Wavell, who had started complaining to the War Cabinet about the activities of Cripps and Johnson. Johnson’s weird involvement was not liked by the Government in London who insisted that he was not Roosevelt’s representative “in any

matter relating to Indian Constitutional issues” and his mandate was only “to deal with questions relating to military matters and supplies.”⁹⁶ The War Cabinet urged Cripps to stick to the “Cabinet’s plan”, and not to do anything without the consent of the “Viceroy” and the “Commander-in-Chief.”⁹⁷ The Cabinet further clarified that no change could be made in the “existing constitution”, and if the “Congress Leaders” were of the “impression that such a convention” was possible, “this impression should be definitely removed.”⁹⁸ Churchill told Cripps that in his “natural desire to reach a settlement with Congress”, he had drawn himself “into a position far different” from the one “approved” by the “Cabinet.”⁹⁹ On the other hand, Azad informed Cripps that he and his party were not ready to “accept the proposals”, unless “a truly National Government” with “full power” was formed.¹⁰⁰ He blamed that the “picture” that Cripps “sketched” before him and his party was “completely shattered” by the change in the policy of the British Government.¹⁰¹ Cripps thought that this demand could not be fulfilled “without constitutional changes of a most complicated character and on a very large scale”, which was “not possible.” He was surprised why Azad all of a sudden started emphasizing a point that was not even raised during the first “three weeks” of negotiations.¹⁰² This was heart-breaking for Cripps, who informed the Prime Minister back home that there was “no hope of agreement” and he would “start home on Sunday.”¹⁰³

The Working Committee of Congress, which was in session from April 2, finally announced its decision on April 11, 1942. The Committee resolved that the proposals were made “because of the compulsion of events” in the light of the “grave war crisis” and not to address “India’s demand for Independence.” The resolution regretted that “certain provisions” were introduced in the proposals “which gravely imperil the development of a free and united nation and the establishment of a democratic state” and even the “constitution-making body” was envisaged in a way that the “people’s right to self-determination” was “vitiated by the introduction of non-representative elements.” Though it accepted that the “future independence may be implicit in the proposals”, yet the “accompanying provisions and restrictions” were such that “real freedom” would become an “illusion.” It

declared that the “complete ignoring of the ninety millions of the people of the Indian States” and “their treatment as commodities at the disposal of their rulers” was a “negation of both democracy and self-determination.” The resolution stated that “the novel principle of non-accession” for the provinces was a “severe blow to the conception of Indian unity” and an “apple of discord likely to general growing trouble in the Provinces”, yet it professed that it would not be “compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain the Indian Union against their declared and established will.” According to the resolution, the Cripps proposals fell short of the native’s demand that only “a free and independent India” could be in a “position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis” and thus could “help in the furtherance of the larger cause” that had emerged from the “war.” In short, the resolution declared that it was not possible for Congress to “accept the proposals put forward on behalf of the British War Cabinet.”¹⁰⁴

On the same day, the Working Committee of the Muslim League met in New Delhi and decided to reject the Cripps proposals. The Committee passed a resolution declaring that though in the proposals “possibility of Pakistan” was “recognized” by providing the option for the “establishment of two or more independent Unions in India”, the restriction of not allowing “any modification” in the “fundamentals” and blocking of “alternative proposals” was a great hindrance in the way of its practical implementation. The resolution stated that the “proposals in their present form” were “unacceptable to them” because a) the option of the “creation of more than one Union” was “relegated” to “the realm of remote possibility”, and was “purely illusory”; b) a “constitution-making body” was “proposed with the primary object of creating one Indian Union”; c) the “right of non-accession” was “given to the existing Provinces” which were formed “for administrative convenience and no logical basis”; d) States were not given the authority “to decide whether to join or not to join” the Indian Union, or to “form a Union” of their own; e) regarding the “Treaties to be negotiated between the Crown and Indian Union or Unions”, there was no solid mechanism to decide “in case of disagreement on the terms between the contracting parties”; f)

there was no “definite proposal” regarding the “interim arrangement.” The resolution made it clear that “it would be next to impossible for the Muslim League to accept the proposals” unless the “principle of Pakistan scheme, as embodied in the Lahore Resolution” was “unequivocally accepted” and the “right of Musalmans to self-determination” was “conceded by means of a machinery” which would “reflect the true verdict of Muslim India.”¹⁰⁵

Talking about the reasons for his rejection of the Proposals, Jinnah argued that the British “Government had not authorized” Cripps “to consider any alternative either for the present or the future” and wanted the League to accept it in “toto” and “not in parts.” However, he highlighted that on the contrary, Cripps while negotiating with Congress discussed the “alternative proposals.” Jinnah believed that if the “alternative proposals of the Congress” including “immediate freedom and independence of India, Cabinet to be nominated by major parties with collective responsibility, Viceroy to act as constitutional Governor-General and the Secretary of State and His Majesty’s Government having no power to interfere” were accepted, it would have meant that the “Cabinet, irremovable and responsible to nobody but the majority” under the “command of the Congress” would have taken over India. This sort of “adjustment” would have been a “Fascist Grand Council and the Muslims and other minorities would have been entirely at the mercy of the Congress.” It would have created the “tyranny of the majority” and have proved to be “the death-knell to the Musalmans of India.” Jinnah denied Nehru’s claim for presenting Congress as the party “representing India.” He clarified that besides the “Musalmans of India”, Congress was also not the true representative of “a large body of the Hindus, the Depressed Classes, the Non-Brahmins and other minorities.” He added that Nehru’s suggestions were “definitely prejudice and militate against the Pakistan demand” and they were “unacceptable” to him and his party.¹⁰⁶

Even when the British accepted that the mission had failed to achieve its objectives, Roosevelt still wanted Cripps to “postpone” his “departure from India” until another effort was

“made to prevent a break-down of the negotiations.”¹⁰⁷ Yet, on April 12, Cripps left for London empty-handed. Despite the failure of his mission, he believed that he had done his “best under the circumstances” and the “atmosphere” had “improved quite definitely.”¹⁰⁸ He was still hoping against hope that the Congress’s refusal “should not be regarded as final” and there was a chance that the “All-India Congress Committee” might review the party’s decision when it would meet on “April 21st.” He asked the British Government that “there must be no recriminations against anyone”, and it should not be assumed that the “Congress leaders” were “not prepared to help.” He further asked the government back home to highlight “Nehru’s fighting statements and speeches.”¹⁰⁹ He was sure that because of his efforts “relations between India and H.M.G.” would improve in the future.¹¹⁰ Before leaving he wanted the Government of India to “liberate” all the “detained” students “as a gesture of their goodwill to the young people of India.”¹¹¹ In his broadcast address, he put the onus on Indian leadership for rejecting his plan and missing a “great opportunity of rallying India for her defence and her freedom.” He claimed that his proposals had incorporated the two most significant demands of the Congress, i.e. “declaration of Indian independence”, and “a Constituent Assembly to frame a new and free constitution for India”, however, it was not possible for him to “impose a form of government upon the Indian people which they did not themselves freely choose.” To him, the only solution to the Indian problem was that “all the leaders of all the political parties and communities to come together in a single National Government” with “a common determination to make it work.” He wished that “someday, somehow, the great communities and parties in India will have to agree upon a method of framing their new constitution” and hoped that his efforts would prove to be “the first step along the path of freedom for India and of friendship between” the “two countries.”¹¹² Churchill appreciated the efforts of Cripps and acknowledged that he had “done everything in human power” and his “tenacity, perseverance and resourcefulness” was enough to prove “how great was the British desire to reach a settlement.” He asked him “not to feel unduly discouraged or disappointed by the result” as

though his “hopes” had “not been fulfilled”, he had laid down the “foundations” for the “future progress of India.”¹¹³

Cripps failed to get his proposals endorsed and the political deadlock in India continued. The main reason was that he had to satisfy a number of political actors, both in London and New Delhi, with diverse opinions and totally opposite demands. His attempts to satisfy the Congress’s ultimatums would annoy minority political ideologies and vice versa. Within Congress, there were different schools of thought. If Nehru and like-minded leaders were ready to negotiate on the proposals, Gandhi’s inflexibility, impatience, pacifism, and, at times hostility, created hurdles in the way of any progress. Gandhi’s outright rejection of the proposals, uncompromising commitment to the ideals of Satyagraha, and his anxiety to keep India out of war forced Congress to discard Cripps’s offer, and without Congress’s approval, it was not possible to implement any scheme. Like India, there was also a clash of opinion among the members of the British War Cabinet. The die-hard conservatives amongst the ministers had no intention of promoting the cause of self-government in India and thus were least interested in the success of the mission. They had mainly drafted the proposals to mollify the ever-growing American opinion in favor of India’s independence. Moreover, the lack of coordination between Cripps and the British officials in India, including Linlithgow and Wavell, further created obstacles in the way of the Mission’s success. It is also important to note that the proposals Cripps brought with him were focused more on the long-time promises and were vague and uncertain about the formation of an interim government on a short-term basis. More importantly, giving independence and rights to the Indians was not the priority of the Cripps Mission as it was primarily a war measure. Another thing that Cripps’s twenty-one days stay in India proved was that Congress was the first priority of the British as Cripps mainly remained engaged with Nehru and Azad during his negotiations while Jinnah and Muslim League were ignored.

References

- ¹ Ishtiaq Hussain Quraishi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1974), 172.
- ² M.A. Jinnah to J.G. Laithwaite, July 1, 1940, NAP, QAP, F. 95/99.
- ³ Proceedings of the Meeting of the AIML Working Committee, August 24-26, 1941, AFM 133/63-73.
- ⁴ M.A. Jinnah to Churchill, February 25, 1942, M. Akram Shaheedi, ed. *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. XVII (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Wing, 2009), 496.
- ⁵ Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959), 33-36.
- ⁶ Linlithgow to Amery, February 16, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
- ⁷ Later Japanese after bombarding Colombo on April 5, 1942, air raided Indian soil on the next day, and dropped bombs on Vizagapatam and Cocanada. They also conquered Andaman Islands, which geniuently created scare in the important centers like Calcutta and Madras. Some people even started leaving Calcutta in Panic. S.M. Burke, *Landmarks of the Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Research Society of Paksitan, 2001), 324.
- ⁸ Memorendum by the Lord Privy Seal on the The Indian Political Situation, February 2, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106b.
- ⁹ Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 15
- ¹⁰ Attlee was appointed as the chairman of the committee while Cripps was one of the six members. Minutes of the War Cabinet Committee on India, February 28, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106b.
- ¹¹ Amery to Churchill, March 9, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106b.
- ¹² Churchill's Statement in the House of Commons, March 11, 1942, NAP, QAP, F. 809/249.
- ¹³ Cripps is reportedly to have been advising the Congress leadership "to stand firm as a rock" upon their demands. B.K. Mishra, *The Cripps Mission: A Reappraisal* (New Delhi: Concept, 1982), 41.
- ¹⁴ In one of his articles published in *Tribune* in May 1940 he openly criticized the politics and stance of the Muslim League. M. Rafique Afzal, *A History of the All India Muslim League, 1906-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 516.
- ¹⁵ V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1957), 121.

- 16 Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1985), 66.
- 17 Peter Clarke, *The Cripps Version: The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps, 1882-1952* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 390.
- 18 Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, 46-47.
- 19 R.J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 82.
- 20 Waheed Ahmed, *The Nation Voice*, Vol. II (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1996), 406.
- 21 Amery to Linlithgow, March 10, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106b.
- 22 Linlithgow to Cripps, March 21, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/98.
- 23 Draft Declaration for Discussion with the Indian Leaders, Published on March 30, 1942, in Nicholas Mansergh, ed., *Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power*, Vol. I. (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1970), 565-66.
- 24 Cripps' meeting with Allah Buksh was planned just to please the Congress leadership, as the latter was busy countering the Muslim League in Sindh by organizing Conventions of the Nationalist Muslims. G.W. Choudhury, "The Cripps Mission", in Mahmood Hussain. ed., *A History of the Freedom Movement*. Vol IV. Part II (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970), 124. Also see M.A. Khuhro to Jinnah, September 24, 1941, QAP, F.365/27-31.
- 25 Cripps Press Statement, March 23, 1942, MSS, EUR, F. 125/141.
- 26 Linlithgow to Amery, March 24, 1947, MSS, EUR. F. 135/11.
- 27 Note by Cripps on Interview with the Executive Council, March 24, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 28 Notes on Executive Council Meeting, March 24, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.
- 29 Note by Cripps on Interview with Azad and Asaf Ali, March 25, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4. Asaf Ali, Azad's Secretary only participated in the meeting because he could help Azad with English.
- 30 Memorandum of a Conversation between Linlithgow and Cripps, March 25, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.
- 31 Quoted by Sikandar Hayat, *The Charismatic Leader: Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 361
- 32 Jinnah's address on Pakistan Day's Celebration, March 23, 1942, in Ahmed, *The Nation Voice*, Vol. II, 406-407.

-
- 33 Note by Cripps on Interview with Jinnah, March 25, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 34 Cripps to Amery, March 26, 1942, IOR, R/30/1/1.
- 35 Cripps to Jinnah, March 26, 1942, NAP, QAP, F.19/1.
- 36 On March 26, Cripps held meetings with Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, Maharaja of Bikaner, Narayan Malhar Joshi, and Henry Gidney.
- 37 Walpert, *Shameful Flight*, 22.
- 38 Cripps note on the Interview with Sikh Leaders, March 27, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 39 Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, 41.
- 40 Cripps note on the Interview with Gandhi, March 27, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 41 Louis Fisher, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1957), 386.
- 42 The delegation included Henry Richardson, Haddow, Lawson, Hodgson, and Parker. Cripps note on the Interview with a group of Europeans, March 27, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4
- 43 Cripps note on the Interview with Jinnah, March 28, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 44 Cripps note on the Interview with Azad, March 28, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 45 The delegation included the Maharajas of Nwanagar, Bikaner, Patiala, and Bhopal along with V.T. Krishnamachari, C.P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, Nawab of Chhatari, M.N. Mehta, and Mir Maqbool Mahmud. Cripps note on the Interview with Deligation of the Chamber of Princes, March 28, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 46 Cripps note on the Interview with the Hyderabad Delegation, March 28, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 47 Cripps note on the Interview with Rajagopalachari, March 28, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 48 Cripps note on the Interview with the Hindu Mahasabha, March 28, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 49 Nehru was out of seen because he was first busy in attending his only daughter's marriage in Allahbad and then he was down with fever for two days.
- 50 Cripps note on the Interview with the Congress Leaders, March 29, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4. Also see Cripps note on the Interview with Nehru and Azad, March 29, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 51 Gandhi's Interview with Eve Curie, March 29, 1942, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. LXXXII (New

-
- Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broad Casting, Government of India, 1982), 156-57.
- 52 Note by L.G. Pinnell, March 29, 1941. MSS. EUR, F. 125/141.
- 53 Proceedings of Cripps Press Conference, Marcy 29, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/3.
- 54 The list of leders whom he met on the morning of March 30 includes Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, M.C. Rajah, Fazlul Huq, Ravishankar Shukla, Maharaj Singh, Jerome De' Souza, Rallia Ram, Periar E.V. Ramaswami, Muthaih Chetttiar, Samiappa Mudaliar, Soundrapandia Nadar, Syama Prasad Mukherjee, and Bhulabhai Desai.
- 55 Broadcast by Cripps, March 30, 1942, MSS. EUR. F.125/141.
- 56 Cripps note on the Interview with Nehru, March 30, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 57 Note by L.G. Pinnell, March 29, 1941. MSS. EUR, F. 125/141.
- 58 Cripps Press Conference, March 31, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/3.
- 59 Note by Pinnell, March 31, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.
- 60 Sikh All-Parties Committee to Cripss, March 31, 1942, Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. I. 582-88.
- 61 Cripps note on the Interview with European Delegation, March 31, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4.
- 62 Linlithgow to Amery, March 31, 1942, MSS. EUR. 125/11.
- 63 Note by Pinnell, March 31, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.
- 64 Azad to Cripps, April 1, 1942, Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. I. 602.
- 65 Cripps to Churchill, April 1, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
- 66 Churchill to Cripps, April 2, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
- 67 Amery to Churchill, April 2, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
- 68 Minutes of the War Cabinet Meeting, April 2, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
- 69 Amery to Linlithgow, April 2, 1947, IOR, L/P)/6/106c.
- 70 Churchill to Cripps, April 2, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
- 71 Amery to Linlithgow, April 3, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11.
- 72 Cripps note on the Interview with Azad and Nehru, April 2, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/10/4. Even Gandhi openly admitted that there were "difference" between him and "the Working Committee" and he had "failed to convert" his "nearest associates." See Gandhi's Interview with an Australian Journalist, April 3, 1942, *Collected Works of Gandhi*, Vol. LXXXII, 163-65.
- 73 Cripps to Churchill, April 4, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

-
- 74 Cripps to Halifax, April 5, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.
75 Linlithgow to Amery, April 2, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
76 Cripps to Churchill, April 4, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
77 Jinnah's Address at the Allahbad Session of Muslim League,
78 April 4, 1942, NAP, QAP, F. 809/291 & 298-9
79 Resolution passed by Hindu Mahasabha, April 3, 1942, in
80 Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. I. 627-29.
81 Linlithgow to Amery, April 5, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
82 V.N. Datta, "The Crips Mission, Its Failure and Significance",
83 in *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 63
84 (2002), 646.
85 Cripps to Churchill, April 8, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
86 Linlithgow to Amery, April 7, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11.
87 Note by Linlithgow, April 8, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.
88 Pinnell to Turnbull, April 6, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.
89 War Cabinet's Committee on India's Paper, April 6, 1942,
90 IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
91 Cripps to Azad, April 7, 1942, Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of*
92 *Power*, Vol. I. 683-84.
93 Cripps to Churchill, April 9, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
94 Nehru's Address at a public meeting in Delhi, April 7, 1942,
95 in *Hindustan Times*, April 8, 1942.
96 Pinnell to Turnbull, April 6, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.
97 Linlithgow to Amery, April 6, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
98 Wavell to Churchill, April 6, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106.
99 Cripps to Churchill, April 10, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
100 Linlithgow to Amery, April 10, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
101 *Coupland Dairy*, 181, quoted by Clarke, *The Cripps Version*,
102 335.
103 *Coupland Dairy*, 223, quoted by Datta, "The Crips Mission"
104 646.
105 Minutes of the War Cabinet Meeting, April 9, 1942, IOR,
106 L/PO/6/106c.
107 War Cabinet to Cripps, April 9, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
108 War Cabinet to Linlithgow, April 10, 1942, IOR,
109 L/PO/6/106c.
110 Churchill to Cripps, April 10, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.
111 Azad to Cripps, April 10, 1942, in Mansergh, ed., *The*
112 *Transfer of Power*, Vol. I., 726-30.
113 Azad to Cripps, April 11, 1942, in Mansergh, ed., *The*
114 *Transfer of Power*, Vol. I., 743-45.
115 Cripps to Azad, April 10, 1942, in Mansergh, ed., *The*
116 *Transfer of Power*, Vol. I., 732-33.

-
- 103 Cripps to Churchill, April 10, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
104 Proceedings of the Congress Working Committee Meeting,
March 29 – April 11, 1942, in Abdul Moin Zaidi, and
Shaheda Zaidi ed. *The Encyclopediea of Indian National
Congress: A Fight for the Finish*, Vol. XII (New Delhi: S.
Chand, 1981) 458-61.
105 Proceedings of AIML Working Committee Meeting, April 11,
1942, AFM 137/15-20.
106 Jinnah's Press Conference, April 13, 1942, NAP, QAP, F.
809/302 & 313.
107 Roosevelt to Hopkins, April 12, 1942, IOR, R/30/1/1.
108 Cripps to Churchill, April 11, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
109 Cripps to Bracken and Amery, April 11, 1942, MSS. EUR. F.
125/22.
110 Note by G. Laithwaite, April 11, 1942, MSS. EUR. F.
125/141.
111 Cripps to Linlithgow, April 11, 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.
112 Cripps Broadcast Address, April 11, 1942, IOR, L/P&J/8/510.
113 Churchill to Cripps, April 11, 1942, IOR, L/PO/6/106c.